eisenhower letter to ngo dinh diem
ngh sao v C TT Ng nh Dim? They emphasized, we believe that Vietnam is not faced with any serious shortage of effective non-Communist leadership. Thomas L. Hughes, INRs director, remains proud today of the list his experts assembled in 1963. 05/09/2018 12:04 AM EDT. Ministers of Vietnam, October 23, 1954. Here we add Krulaks records on the other meetings (Documents 9, 11) and Bromley Smiths handwritten notes, from which he derived the records we had previously posted (Documents 10, 12). Years later, when the Church Committee was investigating the CIA (in 1975), McCone quoted himself telling John F. Kennedy, in precise words that he remembered very clearly, Mr. Ho Chi Minh on founding the Inodchinese Communist Party (1930) While a popular proposal in Washington had been to somehow separate Diem from Nhu, Hughes explained why it would be difficult to achieve that: Diem and Nhu were more inseparable than ever. ISBN: 978-0-7006-1690-9, Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975 "I was shocked by the death of Ngo Dinh Diem. Ho Chi Minh seeks Vietnamese independence in Paris (1919) The National Security Archive is committed to digital accessibility. (Credit:LBJ Presidential Library). Kennedys associates concluded early on that Ngo Dinh Nhu had to go. Some of these materials first appeared in earlier National Security Archive E-books and are added here to provide the larger context of events. Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam, October 23, 1954 DEAR MR. with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. Full text is unavailable for this digitized archive article. but a succession (Document 20). [1] The next day, INR went ahead to craft a paper on The Problem of Nhu (Document 17), where analysts cited South Vietnamese opinions that Nhu had become the dominant power in Saigon, exercising an overriding, immutable influence over Diem.. Letter From Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem - The Vietnam War A Letter From Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem October 23, 1954 Dear Mr. President, I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Vietnam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. the source. Tng Thng Ng Modern History Sourcebook, Fordham University Center Primary Source. (BS Tn Tht Thin) For you, for President Eisenhower, and for the American people, the choice in Vietnam was whether to 'sink or swim with Ngo Dinh Diem.' A Strong Anti-Communist Leader in South Vietnam At Geneva, Ho Chi Minh agreed to stop fighting in part because he was sure he'd win an election in South Vietnam. If you do reduplicate the document, indicate the source. Eisenhower called Diem the "miracle man of Asia." . Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, v. IV: Vietnam, August-December 1963. ideology on your free people. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam The Presidents Intelligence Checklist for August 24, 1963 concluded that Nhu is believed to be behind the recent antagonism against the Buddhists and the imposition of martial law in Saigon. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. TWO LETTERS TO NGO DINH DIEM EISENHOWER'S LETTER TO NGO DINH DIEM October 23, 1954 (Department of State Bulletin, November 15, 1954) Dear Mr. President; I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Vietnam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. Cross examination of Lieutenant William Calley (1970) The discussion that followed is remarkable for the unanimity that had developed among nearly all of Kennedys advisors against Diem. Colby said the coup forces were roughly equal in strength to those that remained loyal to Diem. The Sourcebook is a collection of public I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort. The visits all confirmed what INR had said in its Problem of Nhu memorandum (Document 17). The Sourcebook is a collection of public domain and by a long and exhausting war and faced with enemies without and by their subversive your free people. According to Lodges report of the two-hour discussion, many of the points he raised were nearly verbatim with those he discussed with Kennedy on August 15 including the importance of U.S. public opinion, the role of Madame Nhu, and the recent unrest in Saigon. 2023, A&E Television Networks, LLC. Compared to other versions of Memoranda of Conversation of an August 27 meeting between Kennedy and his aides following William Colbys briefing, this rendition by Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Victor Krulak on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff illuminates new details. After Conein had provided assurance to Big Minh that the U.S. would not thwart a coup, General Tran Van Don asked Conein why General Paul Harkins, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), said the day before that it was the wrong time for a coup and that the planners should desist in their efforts. His methods and policies, particularly his persecution of South Vietnam's Buddhist population, were divisive and controversial. In this letter, President Eisenhower offered South Vietnamese President Diem financial support and encouraged him to make "needed reforms" to broaden his government and make it more representative. All Rights Reserved. Washingtons last opportunity to back out of the Saigon coup occurred on October 29, when President Kennedy gathered his advisers to go over the ground one more time. hc t mt s tun tit (TS Lm L Trinh) It contains 186,751 words in 265 pages and was updated last on March 27th, 2022. Ho Chi Minh recalls his conversion to Leninism (1967) General Taylors recommendations for Vietnam (November 1961) That encounter actually took place at that very time (Document 8). Eisenhower sent a letter to Ngo Dinh Diem, the Prime Minister of South Vietnam, with America's plans and motives in efforts to gain the trust of a possible new American ally. Just as Kennedy ended the August round of coup talks, State Department official Paul Kattenburg, who had known Diem for a decade, had his own experience (Document 14). Nhu thought it would take involvement by the United States to seek an end to the present crisis. Ambassador Lodge was sending home his CIA station chief. Rust; fromRust's articleon Conein inStudies in Intelligence (cia.gov). Rights: Public Domain, Free of Known Copyright Restrictions. A big issue, then and since, has been the so-called Hilsman Telegram, or, more formally, Department Telegram (DepTel) 243, which instructed U.S. This shows that Nhu, even when calm, as Richardson observes, obsessed with Buddhists spreading propaganda and hiding communist agents among their monks at some of the most important pagodas. undertaking needed reforms. b mt c tit l sau 40 nm (T Gn) Taylor wrote a lengthy report afterwards which argued the generals had little stomach for government and had been neutralized. The CIAs chronology of its contacts with ARVN plotters (Document 13) shows that the initial contacts which plunged Washington into a frenzy of deliberations on whether to support a coup in Saigon occurred that day. ISBN:978-0-3002-1780-3, William Colby and the CIA: The Secret Wars of a Controversial Spymaster At this late date Bobby Kennedy still opposed the coup and Maxwell Taylor sided with him, while other officials looked ahead to the composition of a future Saigon government, or focused on tactics or the balance of forces on the coup and palace sides. Diem said that the Buddhist uprising had been resolved. Duong Van Minh Known popularly as "Big Minh," Duong led the South Vietnamese army under prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem. The implications of the articles will be added later. guestbook to General Vo Nguyen Giap on why the US will lose in Vietnam (1966) That was the climate in which ARVN General Tran Thien Khiem asked CIA for a meeting. 24, f.: Meetings on Vietnam, August-November 1963.. Lodge told Diem that he knew little about Vietnam but hoped to advise him on American affairs. Robert McNamara reflects on Americas failures in Vietnam (1995) George Ball argued that Nhu in the ascendant was impossible to live with, making the coup imperative, but the questions were mooted that day when the Vietnamese generals postponed their coup plot. ISBN: 978-1-6209-7088-1, National Security Archive By that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup . copy-permitted texts for introductory level classes in modern European and World history. President Kennedy meets with newly-appointed Ambassador to South VietnamHenry Cabot Lodge. The US Congress Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (August 1964) The mention of assassination occurred at a key moment for the U.S. in Saigon. Edict of Emperor Minh Mang against Christians in Vietnam (1833) (BS Tn Tht Thin), Ngha Diem's anti-communism attracted the Americans. I am CIA Saigon Station Chief John Richardson met with Ngo Dinh Nhu for a conversation that focused primarily on the evolving Buddhist crisis. In 2003 we posted an electronic briefing book with one of the first-released Kennedy tape recordings of a key White House deliberation on the final go-ahead for the coup. Content created by Alpha History may not be copied, republished or redistributed without our express permission. Compare this to Items 6 (audio), 7 and 8 of E-book 302, December 11, 2009. civilians murdered in Hue City in 1968. with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly part3. The Internet History Sourcebooks Project is located at the History Department of Fordham University, New York. Our mission is to engage, educate, and inspire all learners to discover and explore the records of the American people preserved by the National Archives. hc t mt s tun tit (TS Lm L Trinh), Cu The United States' changing connection with Vietnam is demonstrated by the letters from Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy to President Ngo Dinh Diem, as Anderson's chapter "The United States and Vietnam" in-depth examines. Compare this with Items 9 (audio), 10 and 11 of E-book 302, December 11, 2009. Ambassador to Saigon Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. to proceed in a fashion that made clear to Diem that he needed to end nepotism and curtail the activities of his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and other family members, whose efforts were impeding the counterinsurgency war then in progress. [4] Accounts of the CIA meetings with General Khiem on September 16 (CIA Saigon cable 0940) and 26 (Saigon cable 1222) appear in FRUS, IV, pp. Nhus attempts to fend off criticism or ingratiate himself with Washington failed. Thomas L. Hughes Papers, Courtesy of Thomas Hughes. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its One of themthe easiest, Minh saidwas to assassinate two of Diems brothers while keeping Diem himself as a figurehead. In an extraordinary series of notes made by Diem during the coup from his bunker under Gia Long Palace, discovered by Luke Nichter in November 2016 at National Archives II in Ho Chi Minh City, Diem struggled to regain control. 183-186. Kennedy, John F. Kennedy to Ngo Dinh Diem. TT Once American policymakers became aware that the coup plotters considered assassination a potential part of their plan they proceeded very carefully. Kattenburg got the impression the man had a growing neurosis. On August 27 Ambassador Nolting took center stage. (JFK Papers: NSF: Country File, b. Today, the National Security Archive is posting for the first time materials from U.S. and Vietnamese archives that open the window into this pivotal event a little bit wider. President Eisenhower pledges support to Diems government and military forces. Ho Chi Minh condemns French imperialism (1920) Unless otherwise indicated [2] Rufus Phillips, Why Vietnam Still Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned. Compare this with Document 10 here, and Items 9 (audio), 10 and 11 of E-book 302. But within hours he would be deposed and 24 hours later summarily executed by the military. President Ford on Americas post-Vietnam recovery (April 1975). On October 24 (Document 23) Conein met again with Don, who confirmed that Harkins had admitted his error in seeming to oppose a coup. will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in [7] CIA, Saigon cable 1447, October 5, 1963, cited in Thomas L. Ahern, CIA and the House of Ngo: Covert Action in South Vietnam, 1954-1963. mi nm sau tnh hay m (BS Nguyn Tin Cnh ), CS Together, these materials offer comprehensive documentation on the Kennedy administrations August coup talk. A broadcast by Viet Cong propagandist Hanoi Hannah (April 1970) Quotations about the massacre at My Lai hamlet (1968) the future of a country temporarily divided by an artificial military grouping, weakened We have been exploring ways and means to permit our aid to Viet-Nam to be more of State Bulletin (November 15, 1954), pp. Compare this redaction with the one on page 626 of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, v. III, Vietnam, January-August 1963. The Government of the United States expects that this aid According to Coneins report to CIA Headquarters, he did not address Harkins comments but assured Don that Lodge would speak to Harkins. contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower's successor in the White House, would increase the commitment of U.S. resources in support of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime in South Vietnam and of non-communist. Hoping that forces from the south would liberate Saigon, as had occurred during the coup attempt in 1960, Diem ordered all armed forces and paramilitary units to rise up to join me in fighting off the traitors. Diem would be killed within a matter of hours. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, [and] I had one pitcher, Id keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. These lists frequently overlooked Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, who would ordinarily have been Diems constitutional successor. McCone shot back that the best line was no line. He represented the Pagoda Raids as some sort of victory for Diem, absolved Nhu of responsibility for them, pictured Diem as a man of integrity who had tried to carry out all the promises he had made to the United States, and framed Vietnamese Buddhism as manipulated by Cambodia. Author Luke A. Nichter found the document in the Vietnamese archives. In our 2003 and 2009 postings, and the 2013 update, the story of what Kennedy and his officials actually decided about the Saigon coup in August was at the heart of our inquiry. At one point Ambassador Lodge personally assured General Tran Van Don that CIA operative Conein was speaking authoritatively for the U.S. The American government viewed South Vietnam's situation as a cry for This collection of Vietnam War documents has been selected and compiled by Alpha History authors. Kennedy became more specific when he said, The time may come, though, weve gotta just have to try to do something about Diem, and I think thats going to be an awfully critical period. While never directly speaking about a coup, Kennedy signaled that he was willing to accept regime change under certain circumstances. The PICL of November 2 (Document 27) records that Diem and Nhu had been killed. Hilsman dominated the discussion, with Taylor doubting whether Saigon could get along without Diem, and McNamara sought assurances on four points. 199, f.: Vietnam 9/11-9/17/63, CIA Reports.. Again, the 2003 E-book presented an array of materials on these events (Documents 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28), ranging from Kennedys White House sessions to monitor events, to the CIA daily situation reports, to a cable relating several versions of how Diem and Nhu died, to a CIA retrospective analysis of press coverage of the deaths. President Eisenhower: Letter to Ngo Dinh Diem October 23, 1954 [At this Site] Beginning US "humanitarian" aid. Kennedy did a lot of agreeing, letting Lodge talk, but the two concurred the press in Saigon posed a problem, JFK expressed the sense that something would have to be done about Diem, but he didnt want to be driven to that by the press, and he was not yet certain who, other than Diem, the U.S. could support in Saigon. Modern History Sourcebook. From: President Eisenhower To: Ngo Dinh Diem Date: October 23, 1954 Dear Mr. President: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Vietnam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. A US general reflects on US, North Vietnamese tactics (1984) v. t. e. Ng nh Dim, the President of South Vietnam, made a state visit to the United States, the main ally of his government, in 1957. LBJ Library: Bromley K. Smith Papers, b. Robert McNamara proposes increases in US troops (July 1965) They also sought to provide economic support to South Vietnam to bring needed reform to the area and . Tng Thng Bromley Smith again took notes of another meeting held that afternoon. The Presidents Intelligence Checklist for the morning of November 1 began with an update that a coup had begun in Saigon. Nhu ordered that ARVN soldiers be instructed to open fire on any foreigners involved in provocative acts., American officials differed on who might follow Diem and Nhu in leading Saigon. US Defence pamphlet: Know Your Enemy: the Viet Cong (March 1966) D. inhibit the growth of radical Islam. In 1963, he became leader of South Vietnam after a coup in which Diem. Lyndon Johnson on the political aims of the Vietnam War (June 1966) Home | Ancient History Sourcebook | Medieval Sourcebook | Modern History Sourcebook | Byzantine Studies Page Xin vui lng lu bt tng nim n cc v Anh Hng ca QLVNCH Ngo Dinh Diem addresses a joint session of the US Congress (1957) A CIA report on Viet Cong weaknesses and vulnerabilities (July 1965) Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. met with President John F. Kennedy alone in the Oval Office for his farewell meeting prior to leaving for Vietnam. Harkins, a long-time friend of Lodges from their upbringing in Massachusetts and shared time in the U.S. Army, expressed regret for his remarks and said he would inform Don that his comments did not reflect official U.S. Government policy. The US recognises self-governing Vietnam (February 1950), Final declaration of the Geneva Conference on Indochina (July 1954) Despite promising to establish a free, Western-style democratic republic, Diem's leadership was far from democratic. CIA electronic reading room; declassified July 24, 2015. 35+ YEARS OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACTION, FOIA Advisory Committee Oversight Reports, The Diem Coup After 50 Years John F. Kennedy and South Vietnam, 1963, Kennedy Considered Supporting Coup in South Vietnam, August 1963, The Last Brahmin: Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. and the Making of the Cold War, William Colby and the CIA: The Secret Wars of a Controversial Spymaster, Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975, The Ghosts of Langley: Into the CIA's Heart of Darkness. v cc ng bo nn nhn ngh sao v C TT Ng nh Dim? November 15, 1954, pp.735-736. Eisenhower wrote to South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and promised direct assistance to his government. He also wanted to see something on Lodge actually talking with Diem. Learn more on our privacy and legal page. Please visit and sign our for Medieval Studies.The IHSP recognizes the contribution of Fordham University, the I am glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort. FRUS, IV, pp. Eisenhower's Letter of Support to Ngo Dinh Diem, October 23, 1954 Dear Mr. President: I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. Phan Boi Chau on Vietnams awakening (1914) Assassination Records Review Board release, document 177-10001-10466. Step-by-step explanation As discussed in the chapter titled "The United States and Vietnam" by Anderson, the letter written by President Dwight Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem on October 23, 1954 provides evidence to support the notion that the United States' link with Vietnam changed through time. He regarded Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy as other opponents. Central Intelligence Agency: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2000 (declassified February 19, 2009), p. 195. President Dwight Eisenhower: Letter to Ngo Dinh Diem (October 23, 1954) 241 National Security Action Memorandum No. JFK Papers: NSF: Country File, b. Following that there is a relative lull, then contact picks up again in early October when the coup forces were more potent and prepared to make their final push. Bin Tnh Sng - (Hoi cm ca Trn khc Knh). ISBN:978-0-7006-1634-3, The Ghosts of Langley: Into the CIA's Heart of Darkness In addition, Minh said it was vital that American foreign aid would continue to flow after a coup. C. protect Western oil interests. standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied. JFKL: Roger Hilsman Papers, b. While Diem had not yet surrendered, the coup plotters planned to set up a civilian government as soon as the coup was over. He had returned to consult with JFK about the coup, learned while en route that Kennedy had been killed, and instead briefed LBJ while still in his EOB office (along with Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, and George Ball). Ho Chi Minh calls for unity against the French (February 1930) The citizens of America saw this, not as an opportunity, but as a danger to their precious country. One opposition faction centered on former Ambassador Nolting. a de facto rule and political ideology which they abhor, are being fulfilled. Cable 243 discusses the removal of Ngo Dinh Diem (August 1963) US news report on the imminent fall of Saigon (April 1975) After a September lull, the coup plotters in Saigon began to strengthen in early October. We do not reproduce this here because we presented it in both the previous electronic briefings on this subject. All articles are regularly reviewed and updated by the HISTORY.com team. I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied. The received history on this is that Hilsman, Harriman, and NSC staffer Michael Forrestal advocated going ahead with a coup, while other factions opposed it. At the State Department, W. Averell Harriman and George Ball agreed that Lodge ought to delay his arrival in Saigon until the situation had calmed somewhat (Document 4). Ng nh Dim: Th thch u tin (HNT & TTN) Ho Chi Minhs declaration of independence (September 1945) Nhu commented that the South Vietnamese military officers, many of whom were Buddhist themselves, started off in sympathy with the Buddhists following the uprising that occurred in Hue on May 8. Assassination Records Review Board release, document 157-10014-10227. They agreed that the coup plotters would deal only with Conein in the future. Sign up now to learn about This Day in History straight from your inbox. He co-authored today's posting with Archive Fellow John Prados. . The implications of the agreement concerning Vietnam have caused grave concern regarding the future of the country temporarily . Ngo Dinh Diem head of the South Vietnamese government Khrushchev Russian premier backed The Central Intelligence Agency ______ the Bay of Pigs invasion of Castro's Cuba. Another consistent theme among American planners was that there was no clear frontrunner, and it was unclear whether the next government would be civilian or whether it would share power with the military for a time. be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened The suicide note of Hanoi governor Hoang Dieu (1882) CIA operative Lucien Conein, who was a liaison to the generals leading up to the coup, in an undated photo from the 1960s (Credit: William J. 336-346. domain and copy-permitted texts for introductory level classes in modern General Minh renewed the August call for an expression of U.S. support for a coup. The next day, Nolting added that the notion of a coup was based on a bad principle and would set a bad precedent, a statement that impressed National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy (Documents 11, 12). While the forces at the disposal of the coup plotters remained inferior to those commanded by Diem and Nhu, if the U.S. were to back a coup attempt it was important that it was successful. aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Viet-Nam in undertaking Retrieved From http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/psources/ps_eisenhower.html / (Original Work published oct. 23 1954). Officials in Saigon, especially Conein, who acted as intermediary with the coup plotters, were instructed to listen to their plans but to avoid having any input or recommending any specific option especially regarding assassination. An American ally against communism in Asia, Diem embarked on a two-week visit to the United States. collaborators within. Eisenhower asked Kennedy: "Suppose they try to . Step-by-step explanation One can see the flurry of activity in August, during the first serious discussion of a coup shortly after Lodges arrival in Saigon. TT that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort. of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam Ngo Dinh Diem explains why he rejects national elections (July 1955) 198, f.: Vietnam, 7/21-7/31/63.. 204, f.: Vietnam: Subjects: Top Secret Cables (Tab C) 10/3-10/27/63.. United States Ambassador Donald R. Heath delivered this letter from President Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam (Viet-Nam), on October 23, 1954. Modern History Sourcebook. Forrestal also commented, without further elaboration, that others had not been privy to the latest Lodge-JFK private communications. at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign Oval Office, August 15, 1963 (Photo: Abbie Rowe; JFK Library,AR8072-A). TT the Fordham University Center 735-736. 4, White House Meetings 8/26/63-10/29/63, State Memoranda.. Ngo Dinh Nhu explained to U.S. officials the series of events that led to the pagoda raids and the declaration of martial law. North Vietnamese peace proposal (June 1971) John F. Kennedy Library: JFK Papers: National Security File; Country File, b. glad that the United States is able to assist in this humanitarian effort. In a meeting with Nhu, some officers went so far as to express interest in taking part in a coup. Our additional records do not change the impression we expressed in 2009 that Nolting had essentially gone native (Documents 9, 10). When, that May, Ngo Dinh Diems government got into a political confrontation with Vietnamese Buddhists, American frustration increased. JFK sent a succession of study groups to SaigonHuntington Sheldon of the CIA, Robert McNamara plus Maxwell Taylor, General Krulak plus Joseph Mendenhallall to report to him. Dim received a glowing welcome and was heaped with praise as a leader of a "free country" in the midst of the Cold War. in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared Diem agreed to the needed reforms stipulated as a precondition for receiving aid, but he never actually followed through on his promises. The implications of the agreement concerning . Lodge left for Saigon, planning to stop in Hawaii and Japan on his way to receive various briefings and touch base with senior U.S. officials.
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